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The process of nation-state building in Latin America was certainly not 
even; it took longer in some cases than in others; and the creation of new 
republics was far from being a generalized phenomenon, let alone a swift 
one. In the Americas, it can be said that only the United States constituted 
an exception, bringing the experiment of the modern republic into the world 
at the very first fracture of the Ancien Régime. Moreover, the American 
Revolution opened the way for both France and Haiti to also accelerate 
their own internal processes and move to the peak of the so-called Age 
of Revolutions. Nevertheless, even in the example of the early American 
republic, the structures of the modern nation-state would only be fully 
realized much later, in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was only 
in the aftermath of the Civil War, especially during the two decades following 
Reconstruction, that more Hamiltonian-like or centralized policies took place 
in America, promoted by a de facto national state project.1 Conversely, in 
the case of Iberian America, what could be perceived throughout the first 
half of the nineteenth century was a series of long-term political changes, 
initially triggered by the fall of the Spanish Empire and followed by decades 
of revolutions and wars of independence. Attempts at nation building took 
different directions among the various parts of the former Iberian empires, 
and the political map of the continent changed many times over during 
the post-revolutionary period. Liberalism and republicanism wrought many 
important changes to the principles of legitimization of political power,2 
but there was no single republican model for Iberian American countries. 
The label of Republicanism itself applied at the time to a great variety of 
endeavours, some radical, others not, which brought about the development of 
many new political practices. Such practices certainly created modifications 
in the relationships between the ‘many and the few’ and, at the same time, 
extended and redefined the old borders of inclusion and exclusion for the 
new emergent polities. Class, ethnic, racial, and gender cleavages all need 
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to be considered from this perspective, and the different connections these 
groups were to establish with the building of citizenship under the new 
order must be highlighted for each of the different societies under study. 
In short, diversity was what prevailed as ‘the’ pattern.
 A second important factor to emphasise is the importance of analysing 
state building and nation-formation as two intertwined processes. The 
experience appears very different depending on the Iberian America societies 
under examination. In cases where the legal and coercive capacity of the 
previous colonial state and its professional bureaucracies did not begin 
to disintegrate immediately, let alone vanish, elements of continuity with 
the past remained for a far more extended period. The provinces of the 
Peruvian highlands are a good example of such a tendency. In these areas, 
the previous social and political agents did succeed in setting up a great deal 
of the framework within which the development of new political coalitions 
and proposals was to take place. Conversely, there were other cases in 
which the control of the administration of the colonial period became more 
fragmented (as, for example, in the late eighteenth-century Viceroyalty of La 
Plata), and hasty changes and anticipations of separatist efforts predominated 
from 1810 onwards. By the same token, however, a much longer period of 
ensuing political instability predominated in such regions.3
 Thirdly and finally, some brief comment is necessary in order not to 
fall into anachronistic comparisons – that is, into those comparisons which, 
according to some present theoretical models, may erroneously suggest linear 
developments that did not exist as actual options for the decision-makers and 
actors of the time – and, therefore, in order to avoid further generalizations 
about the continent which might lead to misleading conclusions. For this 
reason, it is important to underline a few fundamental historical differences 
that will help us to refrain, from the outset, from any superficial comparisons 
between the United States state-building process and the Latin American 
ones.
 In addition to the pioneering example set, as we have already mentioned, 
by the American Revolution, it is important to note that men and women 
at the time responded to the very specific conjuncture of late eighteenth-
century British politics, in the aftermath of the Seven Year War. This means 
that the representations, values, ideas and concepts at play in their political 
discourses and actions were simultaneously both the product and the response 
to this specific political conjuncture and its challenges.4 Furthermore, the 
US process of nation-building began with the independence of already 
constituted polities in the British colonies. These existing polities were to 
remain as such – that is, a grouping of provincial authorities in a loose 
confederation, mostly dominated by leading Southern elite men and planters 
with a rhetoric of state-rights – until the mid-nineteenth century.5
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 Belonging to a totally new chronology, the Iberian American processes 
of nation-state building shared very different experiences. These Iberian 
societies had benefited already from the examples of the French and Haitian 
Revolutions, and they all stemmed from the unexpected and profound crisis 
that hit the Iberian world and, more dramatically, the Spanish Crown itself, 
in the first decade of the nineteenth century. It can be said that it was 
Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula that immediately opened a phase 
of intense political experimentation for the Iberian empires on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Throughout the vast network of territories ruled by the Spanish 
Crown, new coalitions came into being and local political sovereignty was 
demanded. In this new space of experimentation, symbolized by the Age 
of Revolutions and characterized as modern, new concepts, new words, and 
new projects were created and disseminated in an attempt to make sense 
of the situation experienced by all at the time.6 Contemporary politicians 
and leaders needed to confer some meaning on the ongoing changes, and 
the Cadiz debates regarding the enactment of a constitution in all the 
Spanish territories would open up a totally new set of expectations in this 
Age of Revolutions. The new constitutional charter expressed an in-depth 
reconsideration of the relations between sovereignty and traditional powers 
that existed everywhere. Hispanics in the Americas and in the Peninsula 
debated among themselves the meaning and concepts of sovereignty and 
representation, the idea of nation and the need to subject the monarchy to 
a new constitution. Their shared feelings helped in the creation of a new 
political vocabulary and this resulted in the construction of a new modernity, 
one which was to become characteristic of the entire Atlantic world and 
which would be translated into ideas, attitudes, and unforeseen political 
practices in both colonial and metropolitan societies.7
 During the doceañismo (the period of liberal changes initiated in Spain 
after 1812), the many ideas put forward by the legislative representatives who 
proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812 were to profoundly influence the 
Hispanic world as a whole. The Cadiz Constitution of 1812 became both an 
American and a Spanish document, a charter taken up on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Some of the liberal reforms it enacted (initially conceived for the 
Peninsula), such as the creation of committees or provincial delegations, or 
of ayuntamientos (town councils) in the small cities ended up having a more 
profound and unforeseen impact when applied to the New World. There, 
they helped free the important local powers of many medium-sized towns 
and villages from the influence of the big cities, the usual major colonial 
administrative and political centres of the viceroyalties of the past.
 In addition to this, the Cadiz Charter provided for the complete abolition 
of the institutions of the nobility, of the Inquisition, and of the tribute paid 
by Indian communities and forced labour – such as the mita in the Andean 
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region and the individual serfdom that was still endured by many in the 
Iberian Peninsula. It also sanctioned the creation of a unitary state with 
equal laws to be applied in all parts of the Spanish empire; it substantially 
restricted the king’s authority and entrusted ultimate authority to the Courts. 
By granting the vote to all males except those of African descent, and not 
stipulating any wealth or literacy criteria, the Constitution of 1812 was highly 
advanced for its time. Indeed, it far surpassed the constitutions of the other 
representative governments of the period – those of Great Britain, United 
States and France – especially concerning the extension of political rights 
to the vast majority of the adult male population.
 These two procedures – that is, the enlargement of the electorate and the 
enhancement of their political activities – combined with the establishment 
of a three-tier representative government – the municipality, the province, 
and the monarchy – enabled villages of over a thousand inhabitants to form 
their own ayuntamientos. Thus, part of the power of the main centres was 
transferred to the many small localities, in which an increasing number of 
people began to harbour political aspirations of their own.
 Notwithstanding this unparalleled expansion of political representation 
in Hispanic America, civil wars broke out in the following years. Groups 
that insisted on the formation of local juntas but refused to accept the 
new Spanish government competed against those other groups that chose 
to remain under the authority of the Spanish legislature and stayed loyal 
to the Regency. Political cleavages among the members of the ruling elites 
combined with their mutual regional antipathies and with the social tensions 
they usually experienced, exacerbating the endless conflicts that frequently 
sprung up over the claim for local autonomy by introducing the element of 
political sovereignty.
 There followed a wave of separatist movements that ended only with the 
collapse of the Spanish colonial empire in the Americas. From 1810 to around 
1830 – in less than three decades – nearly 17 new would-be nation-states 
emerged and replaced the four former viceroyalties and captaincies. And, 
in the midst of this warfare for independence, top down solutions evolved 
in the different provinces, sequenced differently in each case. Again, the 
experience of doceañismo constitutionalism and of liberalism did not develop 
evenly.
 Roughly speaking, and for analytical purposes only, five main regions 
can be distinguished in Hispanic America, in view of their particular shared 
features. These are as follows: (i) New Spain and its surrounding area 
such as Guatemala, both marked, from the very beginning, by the spread 
of the constitutional debate over representation and autonomy to towns 
and villages; (ii) Venezuela and New Granada where militarization of the 
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fight and political centralization predominated; 8 (iii) the region of La Plata 
and Chile where the Constitution of 1812 had a lesser influence over the 
political debates and where military power was very much scattered through 
their hinterlands;9 (iv) Lima and the Peruvian highlands where the defeat 
of the royal forces and the liberation of the city of Lima resulted from the 
convergent actions of two distinct army movements, one initiated in the 
northernmost and the other in the southernmost part of the continent;10 
and finally (v) Cuba, where local elites, who had benefited from the Haiti 
crisis, decided to welcome the boom of the sugar-cane plantations and the 
adjustment to large-scale chattel slavery, and therefore fiercely opposed the 
liberalism of the Cadiz Constitution.11
 There is an important distinction to be made in relation to the timing 
of independence in Brazil, vis-à-vis the Spanish American regions. 
I refer to the almost ten-year gap which separated the spread of liberal 
ideas and attitudes – mainly of constitutionalism, autonomy, and political 
sovereignty – in the Portuguese colony from the spread of these same 
ideas and attitudes at the time of the Spanish doceañismo. The Portuguese 
revolutions of Porto and Lisbon, which brought to power the Liberal 
legislative representatives who promulgated the Portuguese Constitution 
of 1822, were both linked to the so-called years of the ‘vintismo’ (1820s). 
In short, unlike the first liberal eruptions in the Peninsula which occurred 
during the early Spanish reaction to the Napoleonic invasions of 1807-1815, 
these late liberal protests and ideas, which mushroomed in Portugal in the 
1820s, belonged to a conjuncture which led to new political demands. What 
was at stake here was not the defence of the kingdom’s territorial integrity 
by its peoples due to a profound crisis experienced by the Crown. Rather, 
in Portugal, liberalism developed as an opposition to and a solution for the 
revival of absolutist tendencies foreseen with the coming to the throne of 
King João VI (in 1818), after the death of his mother, Queen Maria. So, 
in a Spain under attack from the French, liberalism and constitutionalism 
represented mots d’ordre associated with loyalty to the captive King, and, 
at the same time, in support of the autonomy achieved by some provinces 
and towns amid the ongoing war. In Portugal, however, constitutionalism 
was but a reaction against the fear of renewed absolutism brought about by 
the return of a King who had remained safely distant in Brazil during the 
whole period of the Peninsular War.
 As had happened with Spain, the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian 
Peninsula had drastically changed the destiny of the Portuguese empire 
overseas. And, if the flight of the Portuguese royal family and court to 
Brazil at the end of 1807, well escorted by the British warships, did help 
save the crown, it also initiated a totally new phase in the life of the colony, 
a phase which I will now examine in more detail.
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 The first huge transformation occurred with the city of Rio de Janeiro 
which became the seat of the Portuguese empire. In addition, the old 
colonial status of Brazil also underwent significant changes. To begin with, 
the opening of Brazilian ports to all ‘friendly nations’ in 1808 allowed the 
immediate presence of foreign merchants in the colony and Britain became 
the nation that benefited most from such new circumstances, with its products 
enjoying the lowest tariffs vis-à-vis the other competitors.12 The removal 
of the court to Brazil also demanded a new administrative structure of 
government for ruling the empire from Rio de Janeiro. The Prince Regent 
had to govern with the Ministry of War and Foreign Affairs, the Navy, the 
Ministry of Finance and of the Interior. He created the Banco do Brasil, the 
Junta Geral do Comércio and the Casa da Suplicação, or the Supreme Court. 
Throughout this period in Brazil, João VI promoted several expansionist 
campaigns with a view to annexing more territories to the north in 1808, 
and to the south, such as Montevideo, in 1817, when Luso-Brazilian troops 
invaded the city and annexed the territory of Banda Oriental to the Province 
of Cisplatina.13
 Nevertheless, neither the presence of the Crown, nor the patrolling of the 
British Navy could avoid the dissemination of French revolutionary ideas 
across the Atlantic. In 1817, the first republican insurrection sprang up in 
the north-east, in the city of Recife, quickly spreading to most surrounding 
villages of the province. The revolutionaries demanded independence from 
Portugal with the support of much of the city’s population. Led by merchants 
and members of secret societies who professed the ideals of the French 
philosophers and loathed the North American republic, the rebels expelled 
the governor, seized power and established a provisional government.14
 At the beginning, this revolutionary movement was very successful and 
easily spread to the adjoining hinterland areas of Rio Grande do Norte 
and Paraiba. It was quelled, however, in Ceará, and was brutally repressed 
in Bahia. Later, troops and ships were sent from both Salvador and Rio 
to blockade the port of Recife. In no more than a few months, the Luso-
Brazilian forces had put an end to this revolutionary republican experiment, 
and its main leaders were either executed or severely punished.15
 Meanwhile, the situation in Portugal had become more and more critical. 
The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 marked the end of the long period of wars, 
which had affected all of Europe. The withdrawal of the French left the 
Portuguese Kingdom extremely impoverished. Colonial commerce, the main 
source of wealth for Portuguese merchants in the past, had diminished 
significantly with the opening of the Brazilian ports to other European 
nations. Discontent grew and crowds were roused to support a movement 
that demanded the immediate return of the royal family to Lisbon. In 1820, 
a liberal, constitutionalist revolution broke out in the city of Porto, and 
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Lisbon soon followed suit. The Portuguese legislative assembly forced the 
return of the King and demanded that he swear obedience to the liberal 
constitution that was being drafted.
 The following years saw the upsurge of movements in support of the 
Portuguese legislature in many places in Brazil as well, ousting old colonial 
governors and creating provisional government juntas. Representatives of the 
different provinces and kingdoms that constituted the Portuguese empire at 
the time (Portugal, Brazil, and Algarve) were sent to join the Portuguese 
government in Lisbon, where they would endorse the new constitution in 
an effort to curb the absolute powers of the monarch. As a result of the 
pressure of these movements, João VI returned to Portugal in 1821 and 
capitulated to Parliament. He left Brazil, however, in the hands of his son 
Pedro as the Prince Regent.
 In sharp contrast with the revolutionary political liberalism applied by 
the Portuguese to domestic affairs were the legislature’s views regarding 
the issue of the empire. Regarding this question, the Lisbon government 
simply requested the return of Brazil to its old colonial status, in order 
to overcome the commercial disadvantages suffered in the previous years. 
Many Portuguese merchants both in Portugal and in Brazil gave support 
to such intentions, and soon a widespread fear of ‘re-colonization’ divided 
opinions and hastened new groupings of interests, either in favour of or 
against emancipation.
 Tensions between the Portuguese courts and the Prince Regent in 
Brazil escalated during the following years. Among the important elite 
groupings or political factions that disputed the leadership and control of 
the power conflicts of the period were very different interests. The so-called 
‘Portuguese party’, for instance, was formed by merchants with strong ties 
to the Portuguese monopolies, who backed the return to colonial status 
for this part of the empire and wanted Brazil returned to its pre-1808 
situation. This grouping usually counted on the support of the Portuguese 
troops concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and stationed in port-cities in the 
north and south of Brazil. The members of this party might well be either 
constitutionalists and liberals, or stout supporters of the King’s absolute 
power.
 The ‘Brazilian party’ constituted a second large faction. It represented 
the interests of merchants and producers of staple crops and other goods, 
and those who wanted to continue accessing European consumers directly 
without the intermediation of the Portuguese. Among these men were many 
constitutionalists, who looked for autonomy within the Luso-Brazilian 
Empire, but this group also included those who were beginning to dream 
of separatism and of the creation of a fully independent state. This group 
had another thing in common: they also usually counted on the support of 
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the many who had benefited from the presence of the Court in Brazil in 
the previous decades – that is, the Portuguese administrators who remained 
in the government of Brazil after the departure of the King, and a few 
important European financiers and merchants, mainly British and French.
 Last but not least, there was still a range of popular and middle-class 
urban sectors to be considered. This motley group was comprised of small 
merchants, pharmacists, journalists, clergymen and employed freemen who, 
together with a minority of discontented landowners in the north-east, flirted 
with a so-called ‘Radical-Liberal party’ with republican overtones. Some of 
these popular forces believed independence could bring changes to better 
the standard of living of the bulk of the population.
 The Portuguese legislature continued with its rhetoric of ‘re-colonization’ 
and, by the end of 1821, they urged the return of Pedro, by then considered 
to be ‘disobedient’. While strongly opposed on the one hand to the growing 
metropolitan pressure, most provincial elites, on the other hand, feared the 
eventual return of the republican uprisings that which, since the Pernambuco 
revolution of 1817, had been menacing their privileged status, privileges which 
they had consolidated over a long period of time based on the monarchical 
order and almost entirely supported by slavery.
 In particular, the wealthiest elites of the axis of the south-east (which 
encompassed the provinces of Rio, São Paulo and Minas) and of its 
surrounding regions saw their autonomy was at stake, that their political 
importance was being restricted and was indeed at risk of vanishing in the 
short term. Members of both the ‘Brazilian party’ and the ‘Portuguese party’ 
greatly feared the potential consequences that the agitation of the lower 
classes (the homens do comum or ‘commoners’) could bring. Furthermore, 
the threatening shadow of the slave insurrection and revolution in Haiti still 
lingered, with its implication that events of a similar nature could also occur 
in Brazil. The mushrooming of the independence wars in the colonies of 
Spanish America simply brought to the fore what those ruling elites at the 
time feared most – the enlargement of the basis of political participation 
in the advent of an independent government.
 The subject of a new social contract or of new liberties to be agreed upon 
was to become paramount, as the kingdom of Brazil made a move to become 
an autonomous political body. Among the main goals of the ruling elites 
was the maintenance of the monarchy and of the slave order. The Prince 
Regent viewed such an occasion as an excellent opportunity to disobey the 
Lisbon ultimatum, and deftly guided by José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, 
he rapidly proclaimed independence on 7 September 1822. Once free from 
the Portuguese legislative assembly’s constitutional attacks and constantly 
alert to the danger of ‘anarchy’ from below, the forging of the Brazilian 
nation-state began. A new Brazilian Empire was being planned: the name 
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would remain the same – Brazil – and it would continue to be called the 
Brazilian Empire but it no longer referred to that parcel or portion of the 
Luso-Brazilian Empire. The new Brazilian Empire was to be conceived 
now as a whole in and of itself, an autonomous political entity formed by 
new gatherings of contiguous territorial tracts, mainly those controlled by 
earlier loose provincial powers that had previously belonged to Portuguese 
America. Some of these latter territories simply needed to be kept under 
control; others had gained a considerable degree of autonomy and would 
still need to be carefully convinced to obey the new government thereafter 
or be conquered by force.
 As in Hispanic America, at least four distinct regions can be highlighted 
in Portuguese America regarding their different political reactions towards 
the early demands of the Luso-Brazilian authorities and the demands of the 
constitutional monarchy created by King Pedro after independence. These 
regions were (i) Grão Pará and Maranhão, the most northern provinces, more 
prone to side with the Lisbon government; (ii) Pernambuco and Bahia, the 
oldest and more populous north-eastern provinces, each with complex social 
structures of their own (both had flirted with republicanism and, though their 
experiences failed, the local elites were not going to easily give away their 
autonomy during the 1820s); (iii) São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio, the three 
south-eastern provinces which had been benefiting economically since the 
transmigration of the Portuguese Court to Brazil in 1808 and whose elites 
mostly sided with Pedro after 1822; and (iv) the newest province of São 
Pedro do Rio Grande, a convulsive frontier, sparsely populated by people 
of both Portuguese and Spanish descent, and still in dispute at the time of 
independence.
 However, by the 1840s, all of the above regions had come under the 
control of the new Brazilian nation-state, now representing a new coalition 
of forces, and responsible for the building of state power and authority 
upon totally different bases to those which had existed previously. This 
now politically sovereign nation-state lasted, in the form of a constitutional 
monarchy, until 1889.16
 The quelling of political turmoil in the more distant provinces in the 
aftermath of independence cost Pedro I dearly. Dissenting elites revolted 
in Pará (1822), Maranhão (1823), Bahia (1822-23) and Pernambuco (1824) 
and they had to be fought to the bitter end. Whether their demands implied 
the maintenance of the old political links with Portugal or whether they 
expressed attempts to create new radical republican orders, they were always 
viewed as seditious conspiracies and upheavals against the emperor that 
had to be quickly suppressed, since the sovereignty of this new monarchy 
was not to be endangered. However, notwithstanding the efforts of Pedro I 
in the tumultuous border of the southern province of Rio Grande, the so-
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called patriots of the Banda Oriental successfully defeated the Brazilian 
Empire’s attempt to consolidate its authority in the region and declared 
the independence of their republic (the República Oriental del Uruguay) in 
1828.
 Rebellions seeking political autonomy, and even separatism, continued to 
erupt in different Brazilian provinces throughout the whole period of the 
Regencies (1831-1840).17 In the upper north, the revolts of Cabanagem (Pará, 
1835-1840), Sabinada (Bahia, 1837-1838) and Balaiada (Maranhão, 1838-
1840) are known examples of such protests. In all of them, the involvement 
of popular sectors was very intense, increasing the fear of anarchy among the 
elites. In addition to those, there was a new republican movement unleashed 
in the south. It was known as the Farroupilha Revolution (also dubbed the 
‘Guerra dos Farrapos’ or ‘Ragamuffin War’), a revolt which turned into a 
fierce ten-year war (1835-1845) until definitively quelled by the emperor’s 
forces.
 In short, the emperor’s strength derived from his allies in the south-
east, formed by the provincial elites of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and 
strengthened by the progressive support of Minas Gerais. It was from 
these nuclei the influence of Pedro I’s court began to extend into the outer 
provinces. Such was not an easy task, as mentioned before, and the heyday 
of the empire can only be said to have arrived in the 1860s and early 
1870s, during the reign of Pedro II (1831-1889). Peace or political stability 
was an outcome of the conservative regression that characterized the end 
of the Regencies period, led by the Saquarema group, which represented 
to a great extent the interests of the provincial elites of Rio de Janeiro. It 
followed a period of consolidation of established authorities, marked by a 
strong trend towards centralization and by the alternation in power of the two 
main political parties at the time – the Liberal Party and the Conservative 
Party.18 Such political games would last until the end of the Pedro II’s, in 
1889.
 The massive campaigns of the monarch fighting against the insurgent 
provinces relied on local power elites and, in particular, on the help of 
the municipal councils or câmaras which played a crucial role in the 
consolidation of the emperor’s central power. It was their negotiation of 
political authority that hastened the process of centralization, with practices 
that implied, in turn, the granting of concessions to their local allies, and 
establishment of a pact between modernity and tradition, between the new 
and the old.
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